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CONTRACT CONSENTABILITY: AUTONOMY
THREATS, BENEFITS, AND FRAMING
Eric A. Zacks*
Nancy Kim's framework in Consentability: Consent and its
Limits1 provides an excellent guide through the problem of consent
in evolving aspects of modern life. In particular and of most
interest here, she compares and contrasts the idea of consent with
the legal conception of consent, the problem of which is often
criticized but rarely, if ever, solved. Thus, the legal conception of
consent as "an all or nothing concept where the actions of the
parties are considered objectively and statically . . . provides no
guidance regarding which acts should be consentable."2 Kim,
however, is able to go further by illustrating the actual autonomy
interests at stake with respect to transactions and contractual
promises. This, first, demonstrates why the hard cases are "hard."
Further, in doing so, she demonstrates how an accurate
assessment of autonomy interests, together with a balancing of
societal harms and benefits associated with the activity, provide a
more complete picture of what it means to consent and when
consent is appropriate and valid.
This brief piece intends to address three different issues
raised by Kim's book. Part I will apply Kim's framework to
consumer transactions and examine whether it provides useful
insights regarding consumer contract regulation. Part II will
question Kim's differentiation between autonomy threats, which
are treated as a threshold question with respect to whether an act
is consentable, and autonomy benefits, which are treated as a
secondary issue in terms of societal and individual benefits to be
weighed against societal costs associated with an activity. Part III
concludes by discussing the possible effects of the identity,
* Eric A. Zacks is an Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law
School. B.A., University of Michigan, 1998; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. I am
grateful to Chris Lund and Dustin Zacks for their helpful comments as I prepared this
piece.
1. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019).
2. Id. at 3.
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ideology, and moral beliefs, as well as the cognitive biases and
judgment heuristics, of someone utilizing Kim's consentability
framework. In particular, we should be careful to suppose that any
ex post judgment process regarding the appropriateness and
effectiveness of consent, no matter how carefully developed, can
avoid the impact of the same issues that infect (as Kim so
competently details) the consent decision-making process in the
first place.
I. CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS-A REAL THREAT TO
AUTONOMY?
Kim's autonomy framework aptly explains why the law has
been slow to address consumer law concerns. The low bar for
consent in the consumer contract context makes contract formation
an "easy" process.3  In other words, consumer contracts are
generally clearly "consentable," even if that consent sometimes is
less than perfectly voluntary and knowing. Despite the ease of
formation, contract law makes it difficult to avoid liability under a
contract, meaning that consumers often find themselves stuck with
unfortunate, or to use Kim's term, regrettable, terms and
transactions. This again may reflect law's underlying belief that
threats to economic interests posed by most consumers
transactions, in terms of the duration of the threat, its impact, and
the type of pain suffered by such transactions, do not threaten the
consumer's ability to act in an autonomous fashion in the future.
Thus, to many, consumer transactions inherently will never
present hard cases because they do not involve permanent, severe,
and painful physical and mental threats.
Accordingly, applying Kim's framework,4 we see that the
autonomy interests in a consumer transaction are not typically
viewed as substantial. The threats in ordinary consumer
transactions, whether rental cars, payday loans, or even home
mortgages, facially involve a threat to someone's economic
interests. These property interests appear at the lower end of
Kim's hierarchy of autonomy interests, which intuitive and
appropriately ascribes a higher threat (in terms of autonomy
3. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 175, 200-01, 203-04 (2009) (describing modern contract formation
requirements).
4. For these purposes, it is most helpful to refer to Figures 3.4 Hierarchy of
Autonomy Interests and 3.5 Relevant Factors in Assessing Threat Level of Autonomy.




interests) to those that threaten physical pain or injury. For
example, an individual may agree to unfavorable home mortgage
loan terms, which threatens the borrower's economic well-being
and may also threaten the borrower's residence. The economic
well-being is threatened by the homeowner being compelled in
some sense to allocate more of her wages towards homeownership
as opposed to food, clothing, or other essential needs, and the
residence is potentially threatened by foreclosure, or complete loss
in the event that the homeowner cannot make timely loan
payments. These threats, however, again are limited to property
rights (one's money and home) and how one chooses to alienate
them (by making promises to pay and pledging one's house).
Certainly, the borrower's "bodily integrity" is not threatened,
nor is the borrower physically compelled to work or occupy her time
in a particular setting or manner by virtue of the transaction (other
than potentially needing a job with a certain level of compensation
to be able to pay for the loan), and the individual's civil and political
rights have not been threatened. Even when examining the
economic interests on the lower end of the autonomy interests
scale, there are some limits on the consumer, though an
examination quickly demonstrates why these transactions might
be deemed to be weak autonomy threats.
Typically, a home mortgage loan will have a number of events
of default, meaning that the borrower may not engage in certain
activities. The borrower is now required to make regular payments
towards the loan. Although being compelled in some sense to use
her wages to pay down debt does constrain the borrower's behavior,
it does not appear that she would have less "freedom to move, act
or think without assistance or constraint." The borrower can still
decide how to decorate the house, how to pay for the home loan,
and so on.
The homeowner also typically is restricted from selling the
home without paying off loan. This precludes the homeowner from
making certain decisions with respect to property (i.e., alienating
it). If property values go down, she may be unable to sell it because
the lender will not release the lien on the property until the lender
is paid in full or she may face paying the deficiency of the loan in
the event the sale proceeds are not sufficient to pay off the loan
balance.
Even these restrictions, however, must be viewed in light of
the consequences of contractual breach. The homeowner is
constrained in the sense that there is a penalty for not complying
1052020]
Loyola Law Review
with the contract. In the U.S., however, a breach generally gives
rise to money damages, not specific performance. The homeowner
is not literally compelled to pay the loan. The homeowner, though,
would have to suffer the contractual consequences, which could
include foreclosure, default interest rates, attorney fees, court
costs, and so on. Other than foreclosure, even these consequences
may be avoidable to some extent if the homeowner already is
judgment-proof or declares bankruptcy.
Foreclosure does, of course, represent a loss of property rights.
The future loss of one's home associated with foreclosure could
perhaps be seen as inhibiting one's ability to move or act
independently. The loss of one's home potentially represents a
significant economic loss, and losing one's residence can impact
many areas of life, including most obviously shelter but also other
significant areas such as work (preparing for, and commuting to,
work) and schooling (for the borrower or the borrower's children).
The stakes, and particularly the pain potentially involved,
with these economic interests also may be substantial. In the home
loan context, the homeowner is compelled to make the loan
payments or risk losing her home. Losing one's home can obviously
inhibit one's autonomy as defined by Kim (the ability to move and
act independently). Although you may not be told where to go, you
will have nowhere to go if you do not comply. As mentioned above,
there are also psychic injuries associated with the possibility of
losing one's home. The feelings of shame and hopelessness can
preclude an individual from being able to make optimal future
decisions. These duration and pain factors associated with
consumer contracts' threats to autonomy, despite their economic
roots and interests, are perhaps what is missed in the legal
response to consumer transactions.
In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the duration and
pain associated with certain consumer transactions should not be
ignored. Home mortgage loans, for example, may have terms
extending to thirty years, meaning that the homeowner's ability to
utilize wages for different activities, including saving, spending on
other activities, or building equity in the home may be diminished.
In a period where real estate values are not increasing, a
prohibition on sale clause may trap a borrower into paying money
towards an underwater asset for many years. The literature
suggests that many homeowners feel compelled to continue paying
such mortgages and feel shame at their possibility or probability of
106 [Vol. 66
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being unable to do so.5 Accordingly, the loss of social capital and
the emotional impact associated with potential foreclosure could
also be seen as a threat to one's autonomy.
Similarly, the perpetual cycle of debt associated with payday
or other subprime lending increases the threat to autonomy for
consumers. If consumers' wages are consistently eaten up or
threatened by the high interest and fees charged by certain
lenders, then consumers will be unable to act in their own best
interests in other areas. They may forego health insurance,
medical expenses, clothing or other necessary spending to service
indebtedness that is not designed to be paid off (such as loans with
high interest rates with minimum payments only paying interest
and fees). If particular transactions are designed to create a
permanent relationship, such as payday loans that are almost
impossible to repay based on particular wage levels, then the
threat to autonomy necessarily is increased and should raise
concerns about consent.
As explained by Kim and others, though, legal conceptions of
contractual consent in the commercial context are often static and
do not explore the context or dynamic nature of how and why one
consents or whether the nature of the activity threatens the
validity of the consent. This static conception is often based upon
objective manifestations of consent as opposed to an examination
of overall contexts in which the consent was made. This has
resulted, for example, in an over-reliance on the consumer's act
(e.g., clicking "I agree") as opposed to the context of the transaction
(e.g., no one reads the text box accompanying the "I agree"
clicking). Objective manifestations based on an all-or-nothing
interpretation of assent make it easier to find and sustain
contractual consent, which is important for the market economy
and the security of transactions. Kim's framework, however,
rightly cautions against perfunctory conclusions regarding consent
and instead suggests a method to differentiate between different
types of activities, including different types of contractual
transactions. Consumer transactions, therefore, might suggest a
different level or robustness of consent based upon the nature of
the transaction and the autonomy threats involved.
5. Brent White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social





Focusing on potential negative aspects of consumer
transactions, in this instance with respect to autonomy, should not
obscure autonomy-enhancing aspects associated with such
transactions or lead one to overlook the normative judgments
involved with permitting or prohibiting such activities. Kim
addresses the social benefits of particular activities as a separate
question within her framework (i.e., are the social harms
outweighed by the social benefits of the activity?), though one could
imagine comparing the autonomy benefits associated with a
potential transaction directly with the autonomy threats.
For example, consider asubprime lender of last resort for used
automobiles, meaning that the lender is only utilized when the
dealer cannot find anyone else to finance a particular consumer's
purchase of a car (presumably because of the consumer's poor
credit history). The loan rates associated with such loans may
exceed twenty percent, and the automobile is subject to being
repossessed in the event that the loan is not repaid. The threats
to autonomy associated with losing one's mode of transportation
may be significant and similar to those discussed above with
respect to mortgage foreclosure and losing one's home. One is
compelled to pay the loan or else risk losing one's ability to get to
work, to drive children to school, and so on. Because of the
consumer's limited choice, the dealer is presented with the
opportunity to provide an automobile of substandard quality,
knowing that the consumer will largely be unable to pursue legal
action in the event there is a problem with the automobile
(suggesting the threats to autonomy are more likely to be realized).
Assume also that default rate for such loans is fifty percent.
The social consequences of such subprime lending are that fifty
percent of the borrowers lose their automobile because of their
inability to pay the high interest rates. Such borrowers are now
left without a mode of transportation, as indicated above, and their
already poor credit may be further damaged, which could limit
their ability to secure transportation and other consumer goods in
the future. Kim proposes an "Opportunism Corollary," which
provides "that the state should prevent individuals from benefiting
through actions which knowingly harm or exploit others."6 If the
lender knows that fifty percent of the borrowers will default, lose
6. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 69 (2019).
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their automobiles, and harm their credit, is it exploitative to
engage in such transactions?
On the other hand, a default rate of fifty percent also means
that fifty percent of consumers were able to repay their loans.
Their ability to repay their loans means that they were able to
secure transportation during the loan period and now own the
automobile free and clear for the post-loan period as well.
Repaying the loan also can help such consumer's credit score,
which can obviously benefit them in the future with respect to
securing other goods and services.7 These transactions then have
the potential to be autonomy-enhancing and represent a positive
"threat" to autonomy. If such transactions were prohibited or if
consent was difficult to secure or demonstrate, then one's
autonomy is diminished; put another way, autonomy threat
assessments depend on the baseline one uses.
If the baseline is that everyone should be permitted consent
to any activity that might enhance their future autonomy (their
ability to move and act independently without help), then any
restriction upon that activity (whether by requiring a particular
level of consent or otherwise) represents a threat to autonomy.
Although one's current level of autonomy has not been diminished,
it is perhaps lower than it otherwise would have been in the
absence of such restrictions. Viewed in this way, restricting
subprime automobile loans harms not only the consumers who
ultimately would be able to repay the automobile loans but also
those consumers who might not have been able to do so. Since we
cannot know in advance which consumers will be unable to repay
the loans, all consumers are harmed when the restrictions are
imposed. Having the chance (or opportunity) to repay is thus
autonomy-enhancing.8 It is unclear why these autonomy benefits
should not be accounted for together with the autonomy threats in
consentability assessments.
7. Some lenders advertise this as a benefit associated with their subprime loans.
For example, the website for Credit Acceptance Corp. (slogan "We change lives"), a
subprime lender for used automobiles, notes that "Making on-time payments can
improve your credit score. Credit Acceptance reports to the 3 major credit bureaus,
which means you have the opportunity to improve your credit score through on-time
payments on your Credit Acceptance financing." What consumers should know,
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE, https://www.creditacceptance.com/what-consumers-should-
know (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).
8. This is presumably a more compelling case the higher the likelihood (in this




The above discussion is somewhat tied to Kim's careful point
about the difficulty in attaching importance to the robustness of
the consent in difficult contexts. Changing the requirements for
consent would not change the underlying need or desire for the
different transactions, suggesting that solutions aimed at consent
are potentially misplaced.9 If we changed the requirements for
disclosure in subprime loans, such as by requiring plain English,
requiring disclosure of the high default rate for borrowers or
indicating to a borrower how much in interest will be repaid over
the life of the loan, those changes would not impact the borrower's
need to engage in that transaction.0 In the subprime automobile
lending transaction above, where the lender was the only source
available (because no other lenders were willing to underwrite the
loan based upon the borrower's credit), the borrower is unlikely to
be swayed by the nature of the contractual disclosure if the
automobile is needed. Alternatively, one could ban the subprime
loans or restrict the interest rates that could be charged for such
loans. The latter could have the same effect as the former, as the
subprime lender might be unwilling to lend at all at a lower
interest rate because it determined that it would not be adequately
compensated for the risk of lending to consumers with inferior
credit." Either way, such restrictions or regulation could restrict
the consumer's access to capital but would not address the fact that
the consumer needs that access to capital." Accordingly,
permitting such transactions may not be autonomy-enhancing, but
neither is restricting such transactions, particularly if the
transactions will still be engaged in (illegally or otherwise) or if
such restrictions would not alleviate the underlying condition
necessitating the desire for the transaction.
9. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LiMITS 128 (2019) (citing
Omri Ben-Shahar for the idea that "the problem is often not that there is insufficient
disclosure, it is a lack of options").
10. Indeed, Kim notes that at least one study found that the "the effectiveness of
salient credit card disclosures . . . had little to no change on consumer behavior and
the reduction of consumer debt").
11. There also is some evidence that loan rates are higher in states where the
foreclosure process is more cumbersome for lenders. See Dustin Zacks, The Grand
Bargain: Pro-Borrower Reponses to the Housing Crisis and Implications for Future
Lending and Homeownership, 57 Loy. L. REV. 541, 569 (2011) ("[0ne can say with
some degree of certainty, given the Meador and the Zhu and Pace studies, that interest
rates on all future borrowers are raised when lenders face longer foreclosure times.").
12. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 43 (2019)
(describing, in the context of bodily integrity exchanges, how "our non-ideal world
creates a 'double-bind' because banning [such exchanges] won't resolve the underlying
desperation and the social conditions which cause it").
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III. THE LIMITS OF PROCESS
Kim's framework expertly explains why the hard cases are so
hard and does present a logical guide for resolution. Nevertheless,
there are limits to the utility of any framework. A framework is a
tool-a process or procedure that is intended as a helpful guide.
Individuals might be expected to apply the framework to a hard
case differently, either because each individual reaches different
conclusions regarding the questions within the framework (e.g.,
how great is the threat to autonomy in this particular situation?)
or based on the individual's particular sense of logic or facts.
As a general matter, the same biases, heuristics, and other
deviations from rationality that affect the consent process will
impact one's assessment of autonomy threats, voluntariness of
consent, societal harms and benefits, and so on.13 Our emotional
responses could influence our construction of consent, for
example." Alternatively (or in addition), since people generally
"underestimate the effect that external influences have upon
human behavior,"15 this could lead to overreliance upon outward
manifestations of consent in determining voluntariness of consent
instead of carefully examining the context in which the consent is
given. Similarly, the assessment of negative outcomes in hindsight
with respect to particular transactions might lead one to
overestimate their frequency and societal harm. As with other
assessments or adjudications, such determinations are subject to
manipulation by other actors.16
An individual's starting beliefs and assumptions also
presumably will influence the application of the framework and
her ultimate conclusion. In other words, one's normative judgment
about the desirability of the activity will influence one's
construction of consent and whether it is possible to validly consent
13. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
129, 333 (2003) (noting that "[j]udges, juries, and legislators are as vulnerable to these
cognitive biases as anyone else").
14. Our emotional responses to a particular type of transaction, for example, may
color our assessment of consent. NANcY S. KiM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS
LIMITS 43 (2019) (noting that in bodily integrity transactions, "[e]mpathy, sympathy
or disgust may make it difficult to believe that the individual actually consented and
wasn't coerced or exploited").
15. Id. at 14.
16. I argue elsewhere that many contractual features are often designed with
reinforcing an adjudicator's assessment of the freedom of the non-drafting party's
consent. See Eric Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 169 (2012).
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to the proposed activity. In the subprime automobile loan example
from the previous section, one is weighing a fifty percent default
rate (presumably an overall negative event for fifty percent of
borrowers) against the fifty percent full repayment rate (a positive
event for fifty percent of borrowers) and the social consequences of
those different outcomes. One's initial beliefs about the
desirability of the activity will necessarily precede any
examination of the autonomy threats, and that examination of the
autonomy threats is likely to be accordingly colored by such beliefs.
In other words, regardless of the proposed framework, the
judgment process for humans often involves not an objective
assessment of facts followed by a conclusion, but instead an initial
conclusion followed by a selective assessment of facts that supports
that initial conclusion. 17 Similarly, application of Kim's
Opportunism Corollary, which would act to restrain wrongful
behavior, requires a normative judgment about whether one's
actions, such as making a subprime automobile loan with fifty
percent aggregate default rates, knowingly harms and exploits
others.
Accordingly, the judgment process can obscure, and in many
cases enable, the subjective and particular underlying beliefs of the
framer involved in a particular situation. How we choose to
answer particular questions in the framework's process is
subjective and reflects a personal choice. Labeling something as a
minor threat to body and mind can be wrong or at least debatable
to the extent that it ignores or downplays certain threats. For
example, if a framer values bodily integrity more than mental
integrity, then a threat to one individual's body integrity will
obviously be seen as a more serious threat than the threat to the
counter-party's mental integrity. Similarly, whose consent counts
and to what extent can reflect personal or communal beliefs that
can similarly prejudice outcomes as the framework is applied.
For example, Kim's book throughout largely accepts, within
the framework, the consentability of abortion. Kim rightly
identifies, for example, the threats to body integrity involved with
being forced to continue with an undesired pregnancy, including
threats to health (particularly as compared with the threat posed
17. Rebecca K. Helm, Andrew J. Wistrich, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Are Arbitrators
Human?, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 666, 682 (2016) (describing the confirmation
bias, noting that "[p]eople frequently do not test their beliefs thoroughly, but instead
seek out information consistent with what they already believe").
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by an abortion).18 Within the context of a minor's ability to consent
to an abortion, she also describes the limited utility of parental
consent.19 The framework, however, in this instance does not
address or help solve the primary question for many concerning
abortion, namely, the nature of the fetus. Starting beliefs about
the nature, status, and rights of a fetus likely will influence one's
application of the consentability framework.0 In this instance,
what one believes about the nature of the fetus should
(unsurprisingly) impact one's conclusions about whether a fetus,
like the mother, has "bodily integrity" that requires protection (i.e.,
rights with respect to actions threatening such integrity).
Accordingly, the autonomy framework merely shuttles the
underlying starting belief differences through a different tunnel
and the respective conclusions still inevitably will reflect these
differences."
How we frame an issue, in other words, belies our moral
judgments. The above process/substance critique is perhaps
somewhat encompassed by Kim's apt recognition that "[c]onsent is
only part of the equation when it comes to consentability ....
Where the proposed activity has disturbing or harmful
implications for the consenter or third parties, it has a
destabilizing and detrimental effect on social relations and hinders
the attainment of individual goals for other members of society."2
Our assessment of these implications, as suggested above, is
probably not objective and may precede any processed examination
of consent; that is, our particular underlying beliefs regarding the
positive and negative nature of any proposed activity influence our
constructions and conclusions regarding consent and
consentability.
18. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITs LIMITS 134-35 (2019).
19. Id. at 140 (noting the problems that could arise from compelling a teenaged girl
to reveal an unplanned pregnancy to her parents).
20. At this point, it is important to emphasize that this piece's outline of a
contrasting presumed application of Kim's framework to abortion is not offered as an
entry in the debate over abortion. Any process's malleability to substance, however, is
precisely the point. Two people can apply the same framework, and starting beliefs
and values can (intentionally or not) and often will influence their respective
conclusions.
21. Kim's note that "owning the rights to one's body does not mean that one can do
whatever one wants with it . . . [and that] [a] property owner must still respect the
rights of others" might beg the question, at least for abortion opponents, regarding who
is an "other" possessing rights. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS
LIMITS 42 (2019).
22. Id. at 218.
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